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The welfare of the relevant child became the ‘paramount’ consideration in adoption decisions as a result of 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002. This ostensibly brought English law into line with Article 21 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires states inter alia to ‘ensure that the best 
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration’ in the context of adoption. This article considers 
the scheme of the 2002 Act and conducts a survey of the domestic adoption case law under it in the light of 
some of the requirements of the UNCRC, with particular reference to the implications of the Act for the 
child’s relationship with his or her birth family. It argues that the judiciary’s approach to the Act is not 
necessarily compatible with certain provisions of the Convention, but that in any event, the Convention 
suffers from internal inconsistency in this context that reduces its normative force. 
Introduction 
Under the Adoption Act 1976, the welfare of a child to be adopted was merely the ‘first’ consideration in 
adoption decisions in England and Wales.1 The child’s welfare (or best interests as it is often expressed) 
became the ‘paramount’ consideration when the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) was 
brought into force in 2005.2 This ostensibly brought English law into line with Article 21 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC), which requires states inter alia to ‘ensure 
that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration’ in the context of adoption. Of course 
the UNCRC as a whole has not yet been incorporated into English law,3 a state of affairs that continues to 
cause concern for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee).4 Lady Hale has 
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1 Adoption Act 1976, s 6. For an historical overview of English adoption law and practice, see S Harris-Short, ‘Holding 
onto the Past: Adoption, Birth Parents and the Law in the Twenty-First Century’, in R Probert and C Barton (eds), Fifty 
Years in Family Law: Essays for Stephen Cretney (Intersentia, 2012), at pp 152–154.	  
2 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 1(2).	  
3 See, generally, G van Bueren, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Necessity of 
Incorporation into United Kingdom Law’ [1992] Fam Law 373; A MacDonald, ‘Bringing Rights Home for Children: 
Arguing the UNCRC’ [2009] Fam Law 1073; J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (CUP, 3rd edn, 
2009), at pp 47–54. cf Rights of Children and Young Persons Measure (Wales) 2011.	  
4 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration of Reports submitted by State[ ] Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Third and Fourth 
nevertheless emphasised in the Supreme Court that the UNCRC imposes ‘binding obligation[s] in 
international law’5 and the Convention is cited by the European Court of Human Rights when applying the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR),6 which 
has been incorporated into English law.7 Compatibility with the UNCRC is also a very important measure of 
the protection afforded to children’s rights in national law.8 That said, there are significant limitations of the 
UNCRC in providing guidance for national law on adoption that weaken both its utility and its normative 
authority, and these become clear as this article progresses. This reflects Philip Alston’s contention, made 
early in the UNCRC’s life, that it does not contain ‘a specific and readily ascertainable recipe for resolving 
the inevitable tensions and conflicts that arise in a given situation among the different rights recognized’.9 
This article considers the scheme of the 2002 Act and conducts a survey of the domestic adoption case-law 
under it in the light of the relevant requirements of the UNCRC, with particular reference to the implications 
of the Act for the prospective adopted child’s relationship with his or her birth family. It is particularly 
appropriate to consider the consistency of adoption law and practice under the Act with the UNCRC (as 
distinct from the ECHR, where the focus of scholarly discussion often tends to lie)10 given that the 
terminology of the Act appears explicitly to ensure compatibility and may thereby generate political 
advantage for the government of the day.11 While there are limits to the government’s ability to control the 
judiciary’s interpretation of legislation (short of amending the relevant Act), the overall compatibility of 
English law with the UNCRC cannot be measured without considering the prevailing judicial approach. 
The article argues that while the 2002 Act contains a framework that could implement the UNCRC, the 
policy underlying it and the judiciary’s understanding of the ‘paramountcy’ of best interests when applying 
the Act are both normatively questionable and not necessarily compatible with the provisions of the 
Convention designed to protect the child’s relationship with the birth parents. It is suggested that this is true 
even if much of the doubt about compatibility is caused by a lack of clarity in the UNCRC itself. Provisions 
relevant to this issue include Article 21 itself, which requires that the adoption is ‘permissible in view of the 
child’s status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians’ and makes specific reference to the 
‘informed consent to the adoption’ of relevant persons. Other pertinent provisions of the UNCRC include 
Article 7, which protects the right of the child to know and to be cared for by his or her parents as far as 
possible; and Article 8, under which the child has a right to preserve his or her identity and family relations. 
It is not contended in this article that the additional rights protected by the UNCRC should be given priority 
over the child’s judicially-determined individual and immediate best interests in every adoption decision. 
Moreover, Article 20 of the UNCRC obliges States to provide ‘special protection and assistance’, with the 
range of options explicitly including adoption, to those children who cannot be allowed to remain in their 
birth-familial environment on account of their own best interests. But the aim of this article is to highlight the 
fact that the implementation of the UNCRC in the field of adoption law is far from straightforward, which in 
turn emphasises the serious difficulties with the notion of ‘paramountcy’ under the UNCRC as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Reports) (CRC/C/GBR/CO/4, 2008), at para 10. See, generally, Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General 
Comment No 5 (2003): General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts 4, 42 
and 44, para 6)’ (CRC/GC/2003/5, 2003).	  
5 ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, [2011] 2 WLR 148, [2011] 1 FLR 
2170, at para [23]. See also, eg U Kilkelly, ‘The CRC at 21: Assessing the Legal Impact’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 143, at p 144.	  
6 See, eg Keegan v Ireland (App No 16969/90) (1994) 18 EHRR 342, at para 50, U Kilkelly, ‘The CRC at 21: 
Assessing the Legal Impact’ (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 143, at pp 151–152.	  
7 Human Rights Act 1998.	  
8 See, eg U Kilkelly and L Lundy, ‘Children’s Rights in Action: Using the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
an Auditing Tool’ [2006] CFLQ 331; Children’s Rights Alliance for England, ‘State of Children’s Rights in England 
2011’ (2011).	  
9 P Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family 1, at p 2.	  
10 See, eg S Choudhry, ‘The Adoption and Children Act 2002, the Welfare Principle and the Human Rights Act 1998 – 
A Missed Opportunity?’ [2003] CFLQ 119. See now YC v United Kingdom (App No 4547/10) [2012] 2 FLR 332.	  
11 See M King, ‘Children's Rights as Communication: Reflections on Autopoietic Theory and the United Nations 
Convention’ (1994) 67 Modern Law Review 385 for a discussion of the potential for formalistic claims of compatibility 
to be made under the Convention.	  
national law. It begins by examining the ‘paramountcy’ of best interests under the UNCRC and English law 
and analysing the implications of other aspects of the UNCRC. It then considers English law’s compatibility 
with the UNCRC in view of the judicial approach to the child’s relationship with the birth parents in 
adoption decisions, focussing particularly on situations where adoption occurs without the consent of one or 
both parents. 
Throughout the discussion, reference is made to the Concluding Observations issued by the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, which is said to be ‘recognized as the highest authority for interpretation of the 
Convention’,12 in response to national reports submitted by state parties.13 Another invaluable tool is 
Unicef’s Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child.14 While not itself a source 
of law, the Handbook is endorsed by the Chairs of the Committee and aims to synthesise the Committee’s 
views and provide ‘a detailed reference for the implementation of law, policy and practice to promote and 
protect the rights of children’.15 
The paramountcy of best interests under the UNCRC and the 2002 Act 
Textual analysis 
Before the English judicial approach to adoption can be evaluated against the requirements of the UNCRC, 
the relevant text of both the UNCRC and the 2002 Act must be explored. 
Article 21 of the UNCRC and section 1 of the 2002 Act 
Adoption is expressly recognised as a possible form of alternative care for a child removed from his or her 
family environment by virtue of Article 20 of the UNCRC. Adoption itself is primarily governed by 
Article 21, much of which is concerned with inter-country adoption.16 The relevant parts of Article 21 for the 
purposes of domestic adoption provide as follows: 
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best 
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall: 
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by competent authorities who 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all 
pertinent and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child's 
status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons 
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such 
counselling as may be necessary … 
Article 21 does not therefore regard adoption as an essential concept. It seemingly imposes a higher level of 
protection for child welfare in respect of adoption than that generally stipulated by the UNCRC as a whole, 
since Article 3(1) provides that ‘[i]n all actions concerning children … the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration’ (emphasis added). While the Implementation Handbook regards Article 21 as a 
provision in which the Article 3 principle, which on Jane Fortin’s account ‘underpins all the other 
provisions’,17 is ‘evident’,18 the Handbook later acknowledges that Article 21 requires welfare to be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 P Hodgkin and R Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Unicef, 3rd edn, 
2007), at p xvii. See C Hamilton, ‘Children's Rights and the role of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Underlying Structures for States in Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ [2010] International 
Family Law 31 for a discussion of the Committee’s role.	  
13 See, generally, Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Treaty-specific Guidelines regarding the Form and Content of 
Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties under article 44, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’ (CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 2010).	  
14 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child.	  
15 Ibid, at p xiii.	  
16 See, generally, T Buck (ed), International Child Law (Routledge, 2nd edn, 2011), ch 6.	  
17 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (CUP, 3rd edn, 2009), at p 40.	  
18 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, at pp 35–36.	  
‘than simply “a primary” consideration as in [A]rticle 3’.19 On its interpretation, ‘no other interests, whether 
economic, political, state security or those of the adopters, should take precedence over, or be considered 
equal to, the child’s’.20 
Turning to domestic law, the Adoption and Children Act 2002 reflects the previous UK Government’s policy 
(carried through by the current Coalition Government)21 that adoption, by which a child acquires new legal 
parents, should be used as a means of finding a permanent home for children who might otherwise ‘drift’ 
through foster care provided by the state.22 Taken at face value, section 1 of the 2002 Act in substance 
implements Article 21 by specifying that welfare is to be the paramount consideration in adoption decisions. 
Both the UK Government23 and the Joint Committee on Human Rights24 appear to have been satisfied of the 
Act’s compatibility with the UNCRC on that basis, although it is significant that even the UK’s 1994 Initial 
State Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child claimed that ‘[p]resent law and practice 
[governed principally by the previous 1976 Act] comply fully with all the provisions of [A]rticle 21’.25 By 
stipulating that the welfare of the relevant child is to be the ‘paramount’ and not the ‘first’ consideration, the 
2002 Act also brought adoption law into line with the more general principle of English child law.26 The 
proper meaning of the so-called ‘paramountcy’ principle is elusive. Nevertheless, it has often been 
interpreted individualistically such that ’the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests 
of the child’s welfare’ even as against unimpeachable parents,27 a state of affairs that has been criticised.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, at p 295. See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 7 (2005): Implementing Child 
Rights in Early Childhood, (CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 2006), at para 36(b). cf the Committee’s use of the word ‘primary’ in 
relation to adoption: Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration of Reports submitted by State[ ] Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention – Concluding Observations: Tongo’ (Third and Fourth Reports) 
(CRC/C/TGO/CO/3-4, 2012), at para 48.	  
20 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, at p 295.	  
21 See, eg Department for Education, ‘Adoption Scorecards show the Serious Extent of Delays across England’ (11 May 
2012), available at http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a00208881/adoption-scorecards-show-the-
serious-extent-of-delays-across-england (last accessed 16 February 2013).	  
22 Secretary of State for Health, Adoption: A New Approach, Cm 5017 (TSO, 2000). The Act nevertheless applies 
equally to step-parent adoptions. These have drastic consequences as regards the child’s relationship with the person 
who thereby loses legal parenthood, although the 2002 Act did introduce the concept of special guardianship, whereby 
an applicant can acquire parental responsibility and exercise it ‘to the exclusion’ of others without transferring legal 
parenthood (Children Act 1989, s 14C(1)(b)). This provides a less drastic alternative to adoption for step-parents and 
others, though only as regards legal parenthood and not parental responsibility. In Re I (Adoption: Appeal: Special 
Guardianship) [2012] EWCA Civ 1217, [2013] 1 FLR (forthcoming) McFarlane LJ held that: ‘the distinction between 
special guardianship and adoption … should have been uppermost in the court's consideration … where it is common 
ground that the natural family … will continue to play a meaningful part in the young child's life over the years’ 
(para [16]).	  
23 UK Government, ‘The Consolidated 3rd and 4th Periodic Report to UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’ 
(2007), at para 103. See also UK Government, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: How 
Legislation underpins Implementation in England’ (2010), at paras 5.114–5.117.	  
24 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Adoption and Children Bill: As Amended by the House of Lords on Report, 
HL 177/HC 979 (HMSO, 2002).	  
25 UK Government, ‘Initial reports of State[ ] Parties due in 1994: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland’ (1994), at para 284. The report is critiqued in U Kilkelly, ‘The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child – An 
Evaluation in the Light of Recent UK Experience’ [1996] CFLQ 105. The UK’s view on compatibility as regards 
adoption was not apparently disputed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its Concluding Observations: 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (CRC/C/15/Add.34, 1995), although concern was later expressed with 
regard to access to information by adopted children: Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration Of Reports 
submitted by State[ ] Parties under Article 44 of the Convention – Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Second Report) (CRC/C/15/Add.188, 2002), at para 31. Bernadette Walsh considered it 
‘possible to argue that British [sic] law [before the 2002 Act] attaches less weight to the interests of the children than is 
required by the Convention’: B Walsh, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights Of The Child: A British View’ 
(1991) 5 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 170, at p 192 fn 42.	  
26 Children Act 1989, s 1.	  
27 J v C [1970] AC 668, at 709, per Lord MacDermott. See, more recently, Re B (A Child) (Residence: Biological 
Parent) [2009] UKSC 5, [2009] 1 WLR 2496, [2010] 1 FLR 551, at para [37], per Lord Kerr, giving the judgment of 
the court.	  
While there are certainly links between the 2002 Act and Article 21, it is evident that the Article itself 
qualifies the paramountcy of best interests through the additional requirements of paragraph (a). It could also 
be telling that the UNCRC is explicitly referred to neither in the White Paper preceding the 2002 Act,29 nor 
in the Explanatory Notes on the Act.30 The UNCRC and its apparent underpinning principle that ‘[i]t is the 
fundamental right of every child to belong to a family’ are mentioned in the first paragraph of the 
government’s revised adoption guidance,31 but neither appears to be the particular subject of further 
reference in the course of the specific guidelines provided in the 244 page document. This arguably reflects 
the difficulty in balancing the various requirements of the UNCRC throughout the adoption process. This 
article sets out to highlight those difficulties. 
Implications of other Convention Provisions 
Even if the 2002 Act prima facie implements the ‘paramountcy’ required by Article 21, that does not 
necessarily ensure compatibility with the UNCRC. As Unicef’s Implementation Handbook emphasises, 
‘[t]he Convention is indivisible and its articles interdependent’, meaning that ‘Article 21 should not be 
considered in isolation’.32 This has significant implications, since the other provisions of the UNCRC might 
provide clues as to the meaning of ‘best interests’ (a notoriously uncertain concept)33 under Article 21. This 
is true notwithstanding the fact that those other provisions are themselves qualified, and that the notion of 
indivisibility of rights is clearly problematic where multiple rights appear to conflict. In spite of the 
paramountcy of children’s interests and the fact that the UNCRC explicitly seeks not to ‘affect any 
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child’ in either national or 
international law,34 Hodgkin and Newell suggest that ‘there is a presumption within the Convention that 
children’s best interests are served by being with their parents wherever possible’.35 
It should also be noted that while it is unarguably important that adoption should not primarily be viewed as 
a service for prospective adopters, the very idea that the interests of a child to be adopted should be 
‘paramount’ (whether as a matter of domestic or international law) is a controversial one in view of the fact 
that adoption usually terminates the legal relationship between the birth parents and the child.36 Inevitably, 
the rights (such as those under Article 8 of the ECHR)37 of birth parents who do not consent to the adoption 
are prima facie infringed, usually irreversibly,38 by the adoption. It is extremely problematic if their interests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See, eg J Eekelaar, ‘Beyond the Welfare Principle’ [2002] CFLQ 237; J Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the 
Welfare Principle in Family Law – Conflicting or Complementary?’ [1999] CFLQ 11.	  
29 Secretary of State for Health, Adoption: A New Approach Cm 5017 (TSO, 2000). 	  
30 Explanatory Notes to the Adoption and Children Act 2002, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/38/notes (last accessed 16 February 2013).	  
31 Department for Education, ‘The Adoption and Children Act 2002: Adoption Statutory Guidance – First Revision’ 
(including amendments) (2012), at para 1.	  
32 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Unicef, 3rd edn, 
2007), at p 303.	  
33 See, eg H Reece, ‘The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 267.	  
34 UNCRC, Art 41.	  
35 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, at p 296.	  
36 See, eg Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 67. cf ‘simple adoption’, a form of adoption available in France and some 
other civil law jurisdictions, which ‘does not sever the relationship with the family of origin so that the adopted child is 
not entirely integrated into his or her adoptive family’: Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the Adoption 
of Children (Revised) 2008, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/202.htm (last accessed 16 
February 2013), at para 63. See also Kafalah, an Islamic institution recognised explicitly in Art 20(3) of the UNCRC 
that has consequences similar to the western notion of adoption but does not involve a full change of legal parenthood. 
The concept is discussed in S Ishaque, ‘Islamic Principles on Adoption: Examining the Impact of Illegitimacy and 
Inheritance Related Concerns in Context of a Child’s Right to an Identity’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 293. cf Re Q (A Child) (Adoption: Welfare Requirements) [2011] EWCA Civ 1610, [2012] 1 
FLR 1228, at para [67].	  
37 See, eg Re A (Children) (Adoption: Placement Order) [2010] EWCA Civ 344, [2010] 2 FLR 661, at para [64], per 
Baron J.	  
38 See, eg Webster v Norfolk County Council [2009] EWCA Civ 59, [2009] 1 FLR 1378.	  
are given no independent consideration,39 especially since (as discussed in the next section of this article) the 
2002 Act mandates the use of a welfare test to determine whether the parents’ consent to the adoption should 
be dispensed with. It must be conceded that the European Court of Human Rights’ stance on adoption is not 
always consistent,40 and in YC v United Kingdom it saw no incompatibility between assertions that ‘the best 
interests of the child are paramount’ and that ‘family ties may only be severed in very exceptional 
circumstances and … everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to 
“rebuild” the family’.41 Nevertheless, in spite of its self-evident focus on the rights of children, Article 5 of 
the UNCRC itself instructs states to ‘respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents … to provide, in 
a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention’. Moreover, by virtue of Article 3(2), 
states ‘undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking 
into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally 
responsible for him or her’. Jonathan Herring and Shazia Choudhry convincingly claim that the UNCRC 
provides no real guidance on balancing the interests of children and adults,42 and Dominic McGoldrick 
points out that the protection afforded to parental rights under Article 5 is extremely difficult to implement 
because of the conflict of interest between parent and child.43 Nevertheless, Herring and Choudhry do 
suggest that it is more open about the need for a balance between rights than either the Children Act 1989 or 
ECHR.44 
Notwithstanding the ‘paramountcy’ principle contained in Article 21, and whatever the status of parents’ 
independent rights under the UNCRC, involvement of the birth parents in the adoption process and beyond, 
or as a counterweight to that process, should be considered as a significant aspect of the child’s own welfare 
for the purposes of the UNCRC, as well as his or her right to respect for family life under the ECHR.45 
Article 21 of the UNCRC must also be read alongside several of its other provisions. Article 7, for example, 
states that a child has ‘as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents’.46 The 
Handbook notes that the phrase ‘as far as possible’ ‘appear[s] to provide a much stricter and less subjective 
qualification than “best interests”’,47 although it admits that consideration of what is ‘possible’ must include 
consideration of ‘best interests’.  
In addition to Article 7, Article 8 obliges states to respect a child’s right to his or her identity and ‘family 
relations’.48 It is limited to those relations recognised by law and purports to prohibit only ‘unlawful’ 
interference,49 but this has not prevented the Committee from criticising states’ approach to identity even 
when the relevant rules are enshrined in national law.50 Logically, the Handbook does not consider that a 
state could use its own national law substantially to limit the scope of this right.51 A similar argument could 
be made in relation to Article 7, which requires states to ‘ensure the implementation of the[ ] rights [it 
confers] in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See, eg S Harris-Short, ‘New Legislation: The Adoption And Children Bill – A Fast Track To Failure?’ [2001] CFLQ 
405, at p 420; S Harris-Short, ‘Holding onto the Past: Adoption, Birth Parents and the Law in the Twenty-First 
Century’, in R Probert and C Barton (eds), Fifty Years in Family Law: Essays for Stephen Cretney (Intersentia, 2012).	  
40 See, eg the differing opinions expressed in Eski v Austria (App No 21949/03) [2007] 1 FLR 1650.	  
41 [2012] 2 FLR 332, at para [134] (judgment of the majority).	  
42 S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law (Hart, 2010), at p 227.	  
43 D McGoldrick, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1991) 5 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 132, at pp 138–139.	  
44 S Choudhry and J Herring, European Human Rights and Family Law, at p 227.	  
45 On the difficult relationship between welfare and rights in child law, see e, eg S Harris-Short and J Miles, Family 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP, 2nd edn, 2011), at p 556.	  
46 UNCRC, Art 7(1).	  
47 R Hodgkin and R Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Unicef, 3rd edn, 
2007), at p 107.	  
48 UNCRC, Art 8(1).	  
49 Ibid.	  
50 See, eg Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by State[ ] Parties under Article 
44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations – France’ (Second Report) (CRC/C/15/Add.240, 2004).	  
51 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, at pp 107, 116.	  
instruments’.52  
Moreover, Article 9 mandates states to ensure that ‘a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child’.53 Those 
best interests, in turn, can be determined only via due consideration of the child’s relationship with the 
parents, and the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 remind us that adoption may not be appropriate even where 
some form of ‘separation’ is necessary. While adoption certainly need not preclude contact with the birth 
family54 (purportedly protected by Article 9(3) of the Convention),55 in England and Wales ‘it is “extremely 
unusual” to make an order [for contact] with which the adoptive parents are not in agreement’.56 
One situation where separation between parent and child is expressed potentially to be permissible under 
Article 9 is where there is ‘abuse or neglect of the child by the parents’.57 Indeed, states are obliged by 
Article 19 to ‘take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the 
child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation’ while in the care of parents, legal guardians or others.58 Neglect has been 
defined by the Committee as ‘the failure to meet children’s physical and psychological needs, protect them 
from danger, or obtain medical … or other services when those responsible for children’s care have the 
means, knowledge and access to services to do so’.59 Further, it has been seen that a child who has been 
‘temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests 
cannot be allowed to remain in that environment’ is entitled to ‘special protection and assistance’ from the 
state,60 and there is a specific obligation to secure alternative care for such a child under Article 20.61 It is 
also true to say that for individual children, adoption could be an important means for a state to protect the 
child’s ‘inherent right to life’ and to perform its obligation to ‘ensure to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child’, both contained in Article 6. The permanent and state-sanctioned 
nature of adoption could arguably help to secure other Convention rights, including the child’s right to ‘the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health’,62 to ‘a standard of living adequate for the child's 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development’,63 to education64 and to special protection if he or 
she is disabled.65 Indeed, the Committee has expressed concern about a state where ‘domestic adoption for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid, Art 7(2).	  
53 UNCRC, Art 9(1).	  
54 See, eg E Neil, ‘Post-Adoption Contact and Openness in Adoptive Parents’ Minds: Consequences for Children’s 
Development’ (2009) 39 British Journal of Social Work 5.	  
55 Article 9(3) obliges states to ‘respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best 
interests’. A difficulty in this regard, however, is the declaration made on ratification that ‘[t]he United Kingdom 
interprets the references in the Convention to “parents” to mean only those persons who, as a matter of national law, are 
treated as parents’ (United Nations, ‘Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General’, 
Ch IV, No 11, available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last accessed 15 October 2012). This interpretation is expressly said to apply ‘where the law 
regards a child as having only one parent, for example where a child has been adopted by one person only’.	  
56 Re J (A Child) (Adopted Child: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 581, [2011] Fam 31, at para [26], per Lord Neuberger 
MR, giving the judgment of the court. See K Hughes and B Sloan, ‘Post-adoption Photographs: Welfare, Rights and 
Judicial Reasoning’ [2011] CFLQ 393 for detailed discussion. See now Children and Families Bill 2012-13, cl 8.	  
57 UNCRC, Art 9(1).	  
58 Ibid, Art 19(1).	  
59 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 13’ (2011): The Right of the Child to Freedom from 
All Forms of Violence’ (CRC/C/GC/13, 2011), at para 20.	  
60 UNCRC, Art 20(1). See also Art 39, which requires states to ‘take all appropriate measures to promote physical and 
psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture 
or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment …’, and UN General Assembly, Guidelines 
for the Alternative Care of Children (resolution A/RES/64/142, 24 February 2010), Annex, at paras 5–6, 9(b) inter alia.	  
61 Ibid, Art 20(2). cf A and S v Lancashire County Council [2012] EWHC 1689 (Fam), [2013] 1 FLR (forthcoming).	  
62 UNCRC, Art 24(1).	  
63 UNCRC, Art 27(1).	  
64 UNCRC, Art 28.	  
65 UNCRC, Art 23.	  
children deprived of a family environment is not promoted, developed or applied as an alternative to public 
care, even in situations where it is in the best interests of the child’.66  
In spite of this, it is important to note that Article 18 obliges states to ‘render appropriate assistance to 
parents and legal guardians’,67 who ‘have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of 
the child’,68 ‘in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and [to] ensure the development of 
institutions, facilities and services for the care of children’.69 Significantly, Kerry O’Halloran suggests that 
‘the need for a new adoption law to expedite the transfer from public care to private care … of those children 
requiring a permanent home following failed parenting’, such as that provided by the 2002 Act, ‘would not 
have been so pressing if a greater investment had been made in family support services’.70 Indeed, the UN 
Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children direct that ‘efforts should primarily be directed to enabling 
the child to remain in or return to the care of his/her parents, or when appropriate, other close family 
members’, and that ‘[t]he State should ensure that families have access to forms of support in the caregiving 
role’.71 Similarly, the Committee directs that states’ overall goals should include reducing the number of 
young children abandoned … as well as minimizing the numbers requiring institutional or other forms of 
long-term care’, albeit that there is an exception where ‘this is judged to be in a young child’s best 
interests’.72 
One of the potential types of alternative care provided under Article 20 is adoption,73 the Committee strongly 
prefers ‘family-type care’ (including adoption) to institutional care,74 and ‘due regard’ must be paid to ‘the 
desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing’ when deciding upon the appropriate type of alternative 
care.75 Nevertheless, the Implementation Handbook regards the UNCRC as ‘neutral about the desirability of 
adoption’,76 and the Committee has said that in implementing Article 19, ‘due process must be respected’ 
and regard must be given to ‘the least intrusive intervention as warranted by the circumstances’.77 Even 
where some form of intervention is necessary to secure a child’s Convention rights, then, it does not 
necessarily follow that adoption is the most appropriate one. The foregoing discussion of the many relevant 
provisions of the UNCRC has, however, demonstrated the serious limitations to its ability to provide a 
single, clear answer to a given question. 
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72 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 7 (2005): Implementing Child Rights in Early 
Childhood’, at para 18.	  
73 UNCRC, Article 20(3). See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No	  7 (2005): 
Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood’, at para 2(a).	  
74 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration of Reports submitted by State Parties under Art 44 of the 
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eg, BBC News, ‘“Weaknesses” in how children’s homes help runaways revealed’ (18 June 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18478670 (last accessed 16 February 2013).	  
75 UNCRC, Art 20(3). See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 7 (2005): Implementing 
Child Rights in Early Childhood’, at para 36(b).	  
76 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Unicef, 3rd edn, 
2007), at p 294.	  
77 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No 13 (2011): The Right of the Child to Freedom from All 
Forms of Violence’ (CRC/C/GC/13, 2011), at para 54.	  
Policy behind the 2002 Act 
In something of a contrast to the UNCRC’s apparent neutrality on adoption’s desirability, the English 2002 
Act unashamedly aimed to bring about ‘more adoptions, more quickly’ for children in care.78 Indeed, local 
authorities are placed under a duty to initiate adoption proceedings (by applying for an initial ‘placement 
order’)79 where inter alia the authority is ‘satisfied that the child ought to be placed for adoption’,80 and it has 
been recognised as legitimate for a local authority to seek such an order ‘even though it recognises the reality 
that a search for adoptive parents may be unsuccessful’.81 The policy of securing more adoptions, pursued in 
spite of apparently mixed outcomes for children adopted out of care,82 can be seen from the fact that the Act 
allows an adoption agency to place a child with a view to adoption by virtue of the consent of a child’s 
parents (with parental responsibility)83 or his or her guardian, without the need for a court order,84 and the 
fact that parents with parental responsibility can provide advance consent to the final and necessary adoption 
order at the same time.85 Moreover, the Act instructs the courts and adoption agencies ‘at all times’ to ‘bear 
in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to [a] decision [relating to adoption] is likely to prejudice the 
child’s welfare’.86 
In spite of the policy focus behind the Act, a more recent campaign by The Times newspaper criticised local 
authorities’ failure to achieve the Government’s objective of securing more adoptions of children in care, 
particularly in cases involving older children and those from ethnic minorities.87 This led to the appointment 
of (now Sir) Martin Narey as a ‘ministerial adviser on adoption’ who has declared that adoption ‘has drifted 
out of fashion’ and vowed to help in reversing the trend.88 Sonia Harris-Short has rightly expressed concern 
about Narey’s ‘unequivocally pro-adoption’ stance and its potential impact on policy.89 While statistics on 
English adoption from care in 2012 showed an increase of 12% on the equivalent 2011 figure,90 the 
Government is planning reforms aimed at increasing the speed of adoptions.91 Nevertheless, the legislation 
even as it stands could still be said to reflect a preference for adoption over other types of care for certain 
categories of children.92 
It is ultimately unclear whether the Act’s provisions are compatible with the UNCRC given its apparent 
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81 Re P (Adoption: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, [2008] 2 FLR 625, at para [137], per Wall LJ, giving the 
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Leavers) year ending 31 March 2012’ (2012), available at 
http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s001084/sfr20-2012.pdf (last accessed 16 February 2013).	  
91 Department for Education, ‘Children and Families Bill to give Families Support when they Need it Most’ (9 May 
2012), available at http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a00208753/childrens-bill-family-support (last 
accessed 16 February 2013). See now Children and Families Bill 2012-13, part 1.	  
92 cf UNCRC, Art 2(1), which requires the rights under the Convention to be secured ‘irrespective of the child's or his or 
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origin, property, disability, birth or other status; and Art 2(2), which protects a child from discrimination ‘on the basis of 
the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members’.	  
emphasis on adoption as a solution for looked-after children. But the text of the Act does at least attempt to 
give effect to the various interests protected under the UNCRC, for example by specifically directing the 
decision-maker to consider the effect throughout the child’s life of ceasing to be a member of the birth 
family93 and the child’s relationships with relatives (including their ability and willingness to meet the 
child’s needs)94 as aspects of the child’s welfare.  
Whatever the implications of a textual analysis of the Act, the compatibility of national law with an 
international convention inevitably involves consideration of the interpretation and application of relevant 
legislation, and the Committee has requested reporting states to provide ‘relevant and updated information, 
including on the principal legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures in force’ with regard to 
adoption.95  Judicial approaches are a major concern of this article, and the next subsection begins the 
analysis with a critique of the general approach of the judiciary to the notion of ‘paramountcy’ under the Act. 
The general approach of the courts to paramountcy 
As mentioned earlier, English courts have often utilised a distinctly narrow and individualistic conception of 
welfare when applying the ‘paramountcy’ principle to more general decisions about the upbringing of 
children outside the context of adoption,96 and this approach appears to have continued in the early case law 
under the 2002 Act notwithstanding the Act’s attempts to protect the child’s pre-existing relationships. An 
example of such a case is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re C (A Child) (Adoption: Duty of Local 
Authority).97 There, although Arden LJ accepted that the Act set out an ‘extended meaning’ of welfare 
because of the need to consider the long-term effect of acquiring a new legal family,98 she considered that 
Parliament had intentionally prioritised the ‘no delay’ principle above all other aspects of welfare and felt 
unable to ‘quarrel with that basic value judgment’.99 In the case at hand, the priority was therefore ‘finding a 
long-term carer for the child without delay’,100 even if that meant her adoption taking place without her 
father being assessed as a potential carer or even being aware of her existence and without her grandparents 
being assessed as carers, because her mother had consented to the adoption.  
Rather than reflecting the UNCRC’s preference for care by birth parents where possible, Arden LJ expressly 
stated that the 2002 Act did not prioritise the birth family over the adoptive family simply because of their 
status.101 Similarly, Thorpe LJ thought it unfortunate that the local authority in Re C had assumed a duty to 
‘explore profoundly’ the possibility of a placement within the wider family rather than an adoption by 
strangers.102 When citing Re C in the later case of Re A (Father: Knowledge of Child's Birth), Black LJ 
accepted that the Court of Appeal had prioritised ‘the interests of the child as an individual’.103  
As discussed above, the 2002 Act does provide that ‘[t]he court or adoption agency must at all times bear in 
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mind that, in general, any delay in coming to [a] decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare’.104 
Similarly, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has ‘stressed the principle that delay is likely to be 
prejudicial to the best interests of the children’.105 In an observation on a Nicaraguan report, for example, the 
Committee expressed concern that ‘children that could be declared adoptable are left in institutions for long 
periods’.106 Even so, it is not necessarily the case that either the Act or the Committee require delay to be 
given greater weight than all other potential causes of detriment to welfare in every case, especially since 
both the Act and the UNCRC specify other relevant factors. 
The English cases, however, do not always send out an unambiguous message, due in part to a fact-sensitive 
approach. In Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent), for example, Wall LJ emphasised that ‘adoption, 
unlike other forms of order…is something with lifelong implications’,107 and the courts have at times 
required significant evidence of why adoption is more appropriate than foster care for particular children 
whose parents have not consented to the adoption process.108 Moreover, by contrast to the views expressed in 
Re C, a High Court judge has opined in a case with some factual similarities to Re C that ‘[a]doption is a last 
resort for any child’ that should be considered only ‘when neither of the parents nor the wider family and 
friends can reasonably be considered as potential carers for the child’.109 The judge also recognised the 
child’s ‘right to be brought up by her own family’, albeit without specific reference to the UNCRC.110 
Nevertheless, as will continue to be seen below, the English courts’ frequent emphasis on quickly achieving 
a secure adoption placement at the expense of other interests may not give sufficient weight to the various 
aspects of the UNCRC. This in spite of the fact that, as acknowledged above, the Act itself could 
conceivably provide a broad framework through which the judiciary could give effect to the various 
requirements of the UNCRC. 
Adoption and consent 
This section further considers English adoption law as against the status of the child’s relationship with his or 
her birth parents under the UNCRC. It focuses specifically on the issue of parental consent, and the 
circumstances in which it can be dispensed with.111 That said, Jonathan Herring has implied that adoption is 
not necessarily consistent with the rights of a child even where his or her parents have consented to it.112 This 
must be correct from the perspective of the UNCRC, since protection of the child’s status and identity is an 
independent right of the child and an aspect of his welfare. A special guardianship order in favour of the 
prospective adopters may therefore be appropriate in circumstances where the parents consent to adoption 
but this is not in the child’s best interests or compatible with rights under the UNCRC or the ECHR.113 As a 
matter of practical reality, however, it will often be doubtful whether it is consistent with a child’s welfare to 
remain the legal child of (as distinct from being able to receive information about or have contact with) a 
parent who has made a free and informed decision to relinquish his or her parental status.  
On a related issue, it is necessary to consider the impact of Article 12 of the UNCRC, which requires states 
to ‘assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely 
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in all matters affecting the child’, with ‘the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child’.114 Article 12(2) specifically provides that ‘the child shall in particular be 
provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules 
of national law’. In a General Comment, the Committee has stipulated that ‘[w]hen a child is to be placed for 
adoption…and finally will be adopted…it is vitally important that the child is heard’, even where ‘step-
parents or foster families adopt a child’ and ‘the child and the adopting parents may have already been living 
together for some time’.115 In the Committee’s view, ‘the “best interests” of the child cannot be defined 
without consideration of the child’s views’.116 
Under the 2002 Act, while the court must have regard to ‘the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings 
regarding [an adoption] decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding)’ before 
making one,117 the child’s consent is not essential in English law. This does not comply with the 
Committee’s recommendation of a requirement ‘that children of a certain age consent to their adoption’.118  
What consultation with children English Law does facilitate may be vulnerable to the Government’s 
streamlining agenda.119 
This section proceeds by examining the judicial treatment of parental consent where it is prima facie required 
but not given. It then examines the particular position of the unmarried father without parental responsibility, 
whose consent is not even prima facie required in English law. 
Dispensing with parental consent 
It has been seen that Article 21(a) of the UNCRC instructs states to ensure that ‘the adoption is permissible 
in view of the child's status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons 
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be 
necessary’. According to the Handbook, the UNCRC’s ‘requirement for proper consent for adoption has 
arisen because of cases in which children have been wrongfully removed from their parents’,120 and this 
requirement has been interpreted as appropriate ‘assistance’ to the child in preserving identity for the 
purposes of Article 8(2).121 The Handbook suggests that the paramountcy principle contained in Article 21 is 
‘in one sense circumscribed by the legal necessities of satisfying legal grounds and gaining necessary 
consents’.122 Indeed, in a recent Concluding Observation concerning adoption the Committee recommended 
that a state ensured both ‘that the best interests of the child are of paramount consideration, and that the 
parents or legal guardians have given their informed consent to the adoption’.123 That said, the UNCRC itself 
does not explicitly specify that any particular consent is in fact required, a significant weakness.  
Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell nevertheless assert in Unicef’s Handbook that ‘[a]n adoption can only 
occur if parents are unwilling or are deemed by judicial process to be unable to discharge’ their 
responsibilities towards the child.124 In its view, ‘any legislation that permits adoption under less stringent 
conditions would probably amount to a breach of both children’s and parents’ rights under the 
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Convention’.125 English law is broadly consistent with those stipulations.126 In England and Wales, the basic 
position is that adoption requires the consent of all parents with parental responsibility127 and legal 
guardians.128 Compatibly with the UNCRC, the consent must be ‘given unconditionally and with full 
understanding of what is involved’,129 and a mother’s consent to adoption (though not to placement) is 
‘ineffective if it is given less than six weeks after the child’s birth’.130 
Nevertheless, once the adoption has been found to be in the best interests of the child, parental wishes can be 
overridden under the 2002 Act where ‘the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with’.131 
The 2002 provisions, unlike the old law,132 have the potential to conflate the questions whether adoption is in 
the best interests of the child and whether parental consent should be dispensed with, in substance setting 
down a single welfare-based test.133 In doing so, at the final stage of the adoption process they risk violating 
what Elizabeth Cooke has called the ‘central principle’ of English child law that ‘a simple welfare test 
is…inadequate to justify the compulsory removal of children from their parents’.134 As demonstrated by the 
first section of this article, that ‘central principle’ is seemingly compatible with the UNCRC given the 
content of Article 7 inter alia, even if a superficial view of Article 21 might be thought to indicate that it 
applies such a ‘simple welfare test’. 
It had been hoped that the use of the word ‘requires’ in the 2002 Act might result in a higher standard of 
welfare test being applied to dispensing with consent,135 which would have reflected the requirement in 
Article 9 that separation from parents is ‘necessary’ for the child’s best interests. Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeal in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) has rejected the suggestion that there is ‘some 
enhanced welfare test to be applied in cases of adoption’.136 At the same time, somewhat inconsistently but 
with the subsequent approval of the Supreme Court in a Scottish case,137 it opined that the word ‘requires’ 
has a ‘connotation of the imperative’.138 The court also emphasised the need to consider the child’s welfare 
throughout his or her life,139 and in the later case of Re S-H (Children) Wilson LJ denied that dispensation 
involves ‘a straightforward enquiry into best interests’.140 But given the uncertainty surrounding this vital 
question and the apparent willingness swiftly to dispense with parental consent brought about by the Act,141 
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it is not easy to argue that the English judicial approach is compatible with, inter alia, the preference for 
parental care expressed in Article 7 of the UNCRC or the protection for the child’s ‘family relations’ 
provided by Article 8.142 This is true notwithstanding the fact that both domestic law and the UNCRC are 
founded upon the best interests of the child, since much again depends on the proper but elusive meaning of 
‘best interests’. In any event, in applying the 2002 Act the judiciary have not unequivocally taken an 
approach to the evaluation of best interests that is consistent with the holistic and balanced process 
demanded by the UNCRC, particularly since adoption is a notably onerous form of ‘separation’ even where 
it is ‘required’ under Article 9. 
Moreover, procedural obstacles placed in front of the birth parents seeking to halt the adoption process also 
cause problems under Article 9, which inter alia stipulates that where a child is separated from his or her 
parents ‘all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their 
views known’.143 The importance of procedural propriety in the adoption context has been recognised by the 
Court of Appeal.144 Nevertheless, the fact that parents whose consent to adoption is prima facie required 
must apply for leave to revoke a placement order145 (the means by which an agency may place a child 
without consent)146 or to oppose a final adoption order where the child has been placed,147 and that such leave 
will not necessarily be granted,148 means that a parent’s ‘opportunity to participate in the proceedings’ can be 
extinguished in advance of the final hearing such that consent does not even have to be dispensed with at that 
final point. 
Unmarried fathers without parental responsibility 
While the preceding sub-section of this article has demonstrated that parents with parental responsibility can 
often find the need for their consent readily dispensed with, the situation is worse still for those parents 
without parental responsibility. 
The Unicef Handbook opines that ‘[s]tates should reconsider … laws that do not permit fathers of children 
born outside marriage to have any potential rights in adoption procedures’.149 For its part, the Committee has 
referred to the need for ‘both legal parents’ to consent to adoption.150 It is well-known that in English law, 
however, fathers who are not married to the mother of their biological children (unlike married fathers and 
all mothers) do not automatically have parental responsibility (‘PR’) for those children,151 and a father’s 
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consent to the adoption is not required (or required to be dispensed with) if he does not possess PR.152 Since 
most unmarried fathers nevertheless obtain PR (usually through registration on the child’s birth 
certificate),153 it would be an exaggeration to say that English law excludes unmarried fathers from the 
adoption process as a rule. Moreover, in Re F (Placement Order), a ‘travesty of good practice’ was said to 
have occurred when a local authority failed to respond to queries from an unmarried father about the 
adoption of his daughter despite the fact that he did not have PR.154 But Re C (A Child) (Adoption: Duty of 
Local Authority) illustrates that the interests of such a father can nevertheless be prejudiced on a questionable 
basis.155 
Re C involved a mother who had become pregnant after a one-off sexual encounter, and who made it clear 
that she wished the resulting child to be adopted shortly after birth. She kept the pregnancy secret from the 
biological father (as well as her own parents), who did not have PR, and refused to identify him.156 The local 
authority charged with the child’s care and eventual adoption sought judicial guidance on whether it should 
attempt to identity the father, inform him of the child’s birth and possible adoption and assess him as a 
potential carer even though he did not have parental responsibility. The first instance judge held that the local 
authority was under a duty to take these measures on the basis of the new focus on welfare throughout the 
child’s life in the 2002 Act.157 However, the Court of Appeal ordered the local authority not to take any steps 
to identify the father. As we have seen, the priority was held to be finding a permanent home for the child, 
who was four months old by the time of the hearing, without any further delay. This was the course of action 
most compatible with the child’s best interests, on the court’s analysis, and there was no evidence that the 
father could care for her based on what the mother had told the court. Arden LJ was to some extent 
influenced by the fact that the father’s consent was not relevant to the adoption. She admitted that in most 
cases disclosure of the child’s birth and the adoption process would be consistent with the best interests of 
the child. But she held that in ‘exceptional situations’ such as this one it was appropriate for relatives, 
including a father, to remain ignorant of a child’s birth at the time of the adoption.158 It is not entirely clear 
why Re C was exceptional. The precise nature of the parents’ relationship is not given detailed consideration 
in the Court of Appeal’s judgments, which is problematic in itself. In any event, this may simply have been a 
case where the mother, irrespective of the child’s interests, did not disclose the resulting pregnancy to the 
father simply because she wanted nothing further to do with him.159 Similarly, in Re L (Adoption: Contacting 
Natural Father),160 Munby J held that nothing could be done than asking the intransigent mother for her co-
operation once more where it was impossible to identify the father of a prospective adoptee without the 
mother’s help. Any alternative method, he held, ‘smacks too much of the Inquisition to be tolerable’.161 It 
could be difficult to conclude that the eventual adoption in such cases would be permissible ‘on the basis of 
all pertinent and reliable information’, as explicitly necessitated by Article 21 of the UNCRC.  
The stark contrast between the positions of the married and the unmarried father as regards consent to 
adoption was illustrated in the more recent case of Re A (Father: Knowledge of Child's Birth),162 the facts of 
which many people would more readily describe as ‘exceptional’ as compared to those of Re C. In that case, 
a mother similarly sought to prevent a father from finding out about the birth and development of their child, 
whom she intended to give up for adoption. The key difference was that the parents were married and lived 
together with their adult children. The couple had originally lived in Afghanistan, but were granted 
permanent asylum in the UK after several family members were murdered by the Taliban. Unsurprisingly, 
the father suffered from ‘Severe Depression with Psychotic Symptoms and Post Traumatic Stress 
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Disorder’.163 As a result his behaviour was unpredictable, and violent towards both his wife and himself. The 
Court of Appeal nevertheless refused to grant the order sought by the mother. A ‘very high degree of 
exceptionality’ was required before such secrecy could be justified,164 and that test was not held to be 
satisfied. A significant aspect of Mostyn J’s decision at first instance, which the Court of Appeal was 
upholding, was that as the mother’s husband the father had both parental responsibility for, and ‘family life’ 
under Article 8 of the ECHR with, the child. His consent was therefore prima facie necessary before the 
adoption could proceed, and the judge failed to see ‘how the consent could reasonably be dispensed with if it 
has never actually been sought’.165 With reference to the child’s welfare throughout his life, the judge also 
refused to hold that the concealment of the child’s existence from the father was in the child’s best interests. 
A comparison between Re C and Re A suggests that more importance was attached to the relationship 
between the parents than the de facto relationship between each parent and the child. Again, it is doubtful 
whether this approach is compatible with the UNCRC as a whole since the Convention does not obviously 
distinguish between married and unmarried parents.166 In fact, the UN Guidelines on the Alternative Care of 
Children provide that ‘[s]pecial efforts should be made to tackle discrimination on the basis of any status of 
the child or parents’, including inter alia ‘birth out of wedlock’ and ‘all other statuses and circumstances that 
can give rise to relinquishment, abandonment and/or removal of a child’.167 
Conclusion 
This article has highlighted several respects in which the compatibility of English adoption law as applied by 
the judiciary with the UNCRC is open to question. It has focussed on the treatment of the prospective 
adopted child’s relationship with his or her birth parents before the adoption has taken place. 
In spite of questionable judicial approaches, it could be that the Adoption and Children Act 2002 is 
nevertheless itself compatible with the UNCRC. Indeed, the specific adoption-related concerns mentioned by 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 2008 Concluding Observations on the UK’s third and fourth 
periodic reports focussed on the time taken for children of ethnic minorities to be adopted by a family of the 
same ethnic origin and the lack of an extension of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption to 
overseas territories.168 The inevitable but inherent inconsistencies within the UNCRC itself and the 
Committee’s guidance, as well as within the case law under the 2002 Act, make it very difficult to assess 
overall compatibility, such that the ‘blame’ for any incompatibility cannot solely rest with national 
institutions. Much depends on the proper interpretation of both ‘paramountcy’ and ‘welfare’/’best interests’, 
and such a ‘proper’ interpretation may never be arrived upon. This is a particular risk in the absence of a 
supranational judicial body applying the UNCRC equivalent to the European Court of Human Rights,169 but 
it also applies in the domestic context. Moreover, even if the English courts had given weight (or in fact any 
recognition at all) to the various UNCRC rights possessed by the child in adoption cases, they may well have 
reached the same conclusions and would inevitably have been less influenced by the UNCRC than the 
ECHR. 
The essential argument advanced in this article is that the implementation of the UNCRC in the field of 
adoption law is an extremely complex process, partly due to weaknesses in the UNCRC’s own ability to 
guide national law that reduce incentives to ensure genuine compliance. Whatever one’s view of the merits 
of adoption as compared to other forms of care, the difficult process of implementing the UNCRC in this 
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field cannot be considered complete in England and Wales merely because the best interests of the child are 
now expressed to be the paramount consideration in adoption decisions, although it may be impossible 
conclusively to deem the implementation process complete. Adoption could be one area where the state 
(including via the judiciary), in Fortin’s words, is able to ‘exploit[ ] the UNCRC’s internal incoherence’ in 
order to pursue its own ends.170 
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